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JAN-DIEDERIK LINDEMANS: Welcome everyone, on my behalf, to the
trade secrets session of this year's conference. My name is Jan but if you want to
make it very complicated, you can call me Jan-Diederik, and if you want to make
it very simple, you can just refer to me as JD. Besides being an IP and trade secrets
litigator at Crowell & Moring in Brussels, I will also be your host for today's session
as well as the moderator of our very esteemed speakers and panelists that we have
here with us today.
Unfortunately, I have failed to figure out in time what the exact order is in
which I need to present my panel to comply with international protocol and
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etiquette, so I won't complicate things and just go as they are mentioned on the
program.
First, we'll have the pleasure of listening to Lord Justice Richard Arnold,
who has been the IP judge in the UK Court of Appeal for about a year-and-a-half
if my information is correct. Prior to that, Lord Justice Arnold was, among many
other things, the judge in charge of the Patents Court. Lord Justice Arnold’s talk is
based on a ruling that was handed down quite recently in the UK, in the case,
Celgard v. Shenzhen Senior Technology Material. That would be the UK decision.
For the people that are unaware, there's also a US chapter that I assume will be
discussed by some of our other panelists. In the UK decision, the courts took an
interesting approach on the choice of law in trade secret proceedings under the
Trade Secrets Directive.
Next, we'll have Courtney Cox, who is an associate professor at — and I’ve
seen that Hugh is here so — she's an associate professor at “the best law school in
the world.” Her research focuses on the intersection between IP and philosophy,
and in the past years, in particular, she has focused on the use of misrepresentations
to mitigate trade secrets laws. At the risk of over-simplifying the topic that she will
be discussing today, she will actually be addressing something that my children do
all the time, and that is lying as a reasonable measure to keep something secret.
The audience today, as explained, should not hesitate to use the Q&A
section or to raise their hands in true Fordham style to interact with the panel. I'm
also hoping that our other panelists will be frank and share their views about what
will be discussed. If I take into account the warming-up exercise that we've been
doing the past couple of days via email, then I'm convinced that this will be the
case.
Those of you that have attended the Trade Secrets session in prior years will
know Victoria Cundiff very well. She’s a well-informed, well-versed litigator who
heads the trade secrets practice over at Paul Hastings. I was about to say “Here in
New York,” but obviously, she might be in New York, but I'm stuck behind my
computer in Brussels.
Last but not least, it is a pleasure to introduce Professor Sharon Sandeen.
She's the director of the IP Institute at the Mitchell Hamline School of Law in
Minnesota, who also, not so accidentally, actually happens to be an international
authority on trade secrets.
I believe with that, my five minutes that I have are used up and I would like
to invite Lord Justice Arnold to take the virtual floor.
RICHARD ARNOLD: Good morning everybody, or good afternoon
depending on where you are. As Jan said, I'm talking about this case, Celgard LLC
v Shenzhen Senior Technology Material Co Ltd [2020] EWCA Civ 1293.1 Just a
quick skim through the facts. Celgard, incorporated in Delaware and based in North
Carolina, manufactured dry batteries separators used in lithium-ion batteries for use
in electric vehicles. They had an employee called Dr. Zhang from 2005 to 2016,
who was said to have had access to a large body of trade secrets concerning these
separators.
1
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They had a competitor called Senior located in China, in the separator
market. When Dr. Zhang left Celgard, he told them that he was going to work for
GE in California in a completely different field, but in fact, he went to join Senior
in China in 2017 and worked under a false name. Interestingly, that was common
ground. What was not common ground was that, according to Celgard, when they
found this out and asked him what he was doing, he told them that he was working
on different technology, and that was untrue.
At the point where the litigation started, Celgard thought it was on the point
of concluding a contract with a UK manufacturer of batteries, and it discovered that
the UK customer might be starting to evaluate the suitability of separator film
manufactured by Senior. They therefore issued a claim for misuse of trade secrets
in England.
They applied for two things, firstly, permission to serve the claim form on
Senior outside the jurisdiction, because of course, Senior is in China, and they
therefore needed the permission of the court to do that. Secondly, they asked for an
interim injunction, a temporary injunction, to restrain Senior from importing the
battery separator film in question that they were offering to the UK customer into
the UK or marketing it here.
Pending an effective hearing of the applications, they obtained a temporary
order. There was an interesting aspect of the litigation there, because there was
some misleading correspondence about the shipment from Senior. It subsequently
transpired that the film had already been delivered to the UK customer before the
order was granted and therefore it wouldn't have been subject to the order, but
happily, the UK customer agreed to deliver it into the custody of Celgard's lawyers,
so no harm was done.
Now the principal claim that was advanced by Celgard in this case was that
Senior was liable for importing into and marketing, or threatening to market, in the
UK battery separators whose design, characteristics, functioning and/or production
processes benefited significantly from Celgard’s trade secrets, which Senior had
unlawfully acquired and used.
The judge at first instance granted Celgard permission to serve out of the
jurisdiction and he granted an interim injunction. There was then an appeal to the
Court of Appeal. One of the key points on appeal was that Senior argued that the
judge was wrong to conclude that the applicable law was English law, and he should
have held that the applicable law was Chinese law. The Court of Appeal dismissed
the appeal, holding that it was probable that the applicable law was English law.
Now, we need to look at two European pieces of legislation here. First of
all, the relatively new Trade Secrets Directive. 2 This contains various definitions in
Article 2,3 one of which is this definition of infringing goods on the slide. It means
“goods, the design, characteristics, functioning, production process, or marketing
of which significantly benefits from trade secrets unlawfully acquired, used, or
disclosed.” Note that word, “unlawfully”.
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Then in Article 4, 4 we've got various substantive provisions of which the
key ones for present purposes are paragraphs three and five. Three says that the use
of a trade secret shall be considered unlawful where the person in question has
acquired the trade secret unlawfully. Again, note that word, “unlawfully.”
Then paragraph five says that the production offering or placing on the
market of infringing goods or the importation, export, or storage of infringing goods
for those purposes shall also be considered an unlawful use of a trade secret where
the person carrying out such activities knew or ought, under the circumstances, to
have known that the trade secret was used unlawfully within the meaning of
paragraph three. This is a really interesting provision because it's an intellectual
property-type provision in a trade secrets law.
The other piece of legislation we need to look at is the EU legislation which
regulates conflicts of laws, and this is the Rome II Regulation.5 We start with
Article 66 that tells us that the law applicable to an act of unfair competition shall
be the law of the country where the competitive relations are likely to be affected.
Trade secret misuse is an act of unfair competition, so we're within Article 6, but
then paragraph two of Article 6 says that where it affects exclusively the interest of
a specific competitor, then you apply Article 4 7 and we're in that scenario. Article
4, paragraph one says that the law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising
out of a tort shall be the country in which the damage occurs.
Those are the two pieces of legislation we have to apply to this situation
when answering the question, “What is the applicable law?”
Celgard's case was to say that Article 4 (1) of Rome II led to English law
being the applicable law because the direct damage caused by the wrongdoing it
complained of had occurred and would, if not restrained, continue to occur in the
UK, that being the country into which the infringing goods, namely the shipment
to the UK customer and any future shipments of the same separator, had been and
would be imported, causing damage to Celgard's market here in the UK.
By contrast, Senior said that Chinese law applied because confidential
information, and trade secrets are a species of confidential information, was
intangible property, and damage to intangible property was located at the time and
place it became irreversible. One of the arguments they put forward in favor of that
analysis is that it gives you a single applicable law.
The Court of Appeal rejected Senior's argument for a number of reasons
including the following. Firstly, confidential information was not property.
Secondly, there was no need to locate the direct damage in a single country because
the explanatory memorandum that was promulgated by the Commission when the
Trade Secrets Directive was proposed envisaged the distributive application of the
laws of each country where direct damage was sustained.
Next, the act of unfair competition was the importation into and marketing
in the UK of infringing goods. The fact that they were manufactured in China was
immaterial, and Senior's argument would favor the application of laws of countries
4

Directive 2016/943, art. 4, 2016 O.J. (L 157) 1 (EC).
Commission Regulation 864/2007, 2007 O.J. (L 199) 40.
6
Commission Regulation 864/2007, art. 6, 2007 O.J. (L 199) 40.
7
Commission Regulation 864/2007, art. 4, 2007 O.J. (L 199) 40.
5

4

Session 7D
with weak trade secrets protection, contrary to the purpose of the Directive.
However, the court asked the parties a question, which they hadn't thought about
themselves, which is, what about Article 4(5)? What law do we apply under Article
4(5) of the Trade Secrets Directive to determine whether the secret was acquired
unlawfully?
When we asked that question, we got quite different answers from the
parties. Senior said, "Well, look, it talks about where the trade secret was
unlawfully acquired. That must involve application of the law of the place where
the trade secret was allegedly acquired, here China, because that's where Dr. Zhang
was, and it was therefore an implicit choice of law rule."
Celgard said, "Well, there's two possibilities. Either it must be an
autonomous interpretation of the Directive, and that leads to EU law being the
relevant law or alternatively, if it's got to be some national law, then you apply the
law under Rome II."
The provisional view taken by the court, on which it wasn't necessary to
reach a final decision, was that the applicable law was the one indicated by the third
of those answers, namely, it's the law you determine applying the Rome II
Regulation. In favor of that were really three main reasons. Firstly, there was
nothing in the Trade Secrets Directive to indicate it was intended to include a choice
of law rule, whereas that was the function of the Regulation.
Secondly, it was doubtful that the applicable law was EU law, because EU
law wouldn't really give you a complete answer. You need a national law, and the
Directive is full of references to national law. Lastly, it was doubtful that it was
consistent with the objectives of the Directive to apply the law of the country of
acquisition if that was different to the law determined by the Rome II regulation.
That's a whistle-stop tour through that decision. I hope to take some
questions.
JAN-DIEDERIK LINDEMANS: Thank you, Lord Justice. I see that in the
Q&A there's no questions, so let me make a small observation as an introduction to
maybe some feedback that we might get from our panelists.
In the ‘confidentiality club’ that we created these past few days among
ourselves, I admitted that I never read Article 4(5) of the Directive in relation to the
choice of law discussion. For me, it was always a provision that the European
lawmakers included to give some extra punching power to the trade secrets holder,
to which then Professor Sandeen candidly replied that she actually saw the exact
same provision as the cradle of what, according to her, was “a new wrong” in
European trade secret matters. I found that very interesting and I thought if she
maybe could share that view of hers with the public, which might then trigger some
questions.
SHARON SANDEEN: Thank you very much. It was noticeable to me that
it's a new wrong because historically, looking at trade secret law through the lens
of US law, which of course has since been used as the driver of international
harmonization efforts, what we've traditionally thought about as wrongs under trade
secret law are wrongful acquisition, wrongful disclosure and wrongful use. What
you have now is a list of other things that could be wrongful under Article 4(5) of
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the Trade Secrets Directive, including wrongful production, offering for sale,
placing for sale, importation, exportation, and storage.
When you read Article 4(5), I think one of the big questions is: “What is the
requisite state of mind of the defendant when they're engaging in any of those
behaviors?” It seems to point back to the other provisions of that particular article,
particularly I think Article 4(4). We have to consider what the defendant needed to
know and when they needed to know it.
I think that's a problematic issue, not just in interpreting that provision, but
also from a policy point of view because what I'm concerned about is shopkeepers,
as I called them in our exchange, becoming liable for trade secret misappropriation
just because they get a cease-and-desist letter, even though they weren't actually
involved in any act of what we would consider trade secret misappropriation.
JAN-DIEDERIK LINDEMANS: Thank you, professor. You will
understand that even though I work for an American law firm, when I heard your
concerns, you actually, in my view, had a quite conservative view of what the
extraterritorial application of US laws should be or the international jurisdiction of
US courts. I understood from Vicky that the answer is more nuanced than my view.
Maybe, as you enlightened me, Vicky, you could also explain a little bit to our
public what your more nuanced opinion is there.
VICTORIA CUNDIFF: Sure, thank you. I think this whole dispute does
underscore the importance that trade secret owners who face misappropriation in
international markets may need to be pursuing lawsuits in multiple jurisdictions.
What is quite interesting is that the same parties plus some additional ones have
been involved in two lawsuits in the United States relating to essentially the same
facts as Justice Arnold noted in his presentation.
Celgard is based in North Carolina and at least part of their argument was
that the lead individual defendant had acquired trade secrets in North Carolina,
which he then dispersed allegedly through subterfuge back to China where they
were used to produce goods that were exported throughout the world.
In the United States, there would be a couple of routes to potentially remedy
the wrongdoing. One is under the Defend Trade Secrets Act, 8 which does provide
the possibility of substantive claims in the United States under the US law for acts
of misappropriation that took place primarily abroad, so long as acts in furtherance
took place within the United States. However, there is still a need to secure
jurisdiction over all of the defendants.
In the California case, some of the goods had made their way to
shopkeepers, as Sharon would refer to them, and the pleadings were rejected. The
case was dismissed because, at least as to the shopkeepers, there were no plausible
allegations that they knew or should've known of some misappropriation, or that
the corporate defendant had in fact directed that those goods go to particular sellers
in California.
I think I would disagree actually with Professor Sandeen’s observation that
Section 4(5) is a new wrong, and we can discuss that in due course. But under US
law, one possibility would be the assertion of an [inaudible] trade commission,
which is an in rem claim against the importation of goods into the United States
8
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made through acts of misappropriation that, under US law, would be found
violative of US law.
In fact, even if US law may conflict with, for example, the law of China, an
importation order can be entered in the US. The problem is that because of the labor
intensity of bringing such proceedings, only about ten of them that deal solely with
trade secrets have been brought each year in recent years. They can be
extraordinarily powerful remedies, however.
JAN-DIEDERIK LINDEMANS: The basic understanding is that you can
also combine them with patent claims, if need be, to make them more efficient?
VICTORIA CUNDIFF: Yes. Courtney’s back, so Courtney.
COURTNEY COX: I'm so thrilled to be here. For this project, or part of it,
one of the early hooks that I found for a suspicion that I had was actually in one of
Vicky's papers. It's a niche issue, but it's growing.
There's lots of case law about the use of lies by trade secret defendants. We
saw some of that in Lord Justice Arnold’s talk about defendants who
misrepresented who they are at some point in the process and used that kind of
subterfuge in order to gain access to trade secrets. There's been a lot of really
interesting philosophical work lately on lying, on the wrongs that are associated
with lying, and also on conceptual questions about what lies are.
Some of that got me thinking, “Well, gee, as Jan-Diederik, suggested, what
about using a lie to protect information that you don't want to share?” Maybe it's
your kids who are lying to each other or an overly inquisitive mother-in-law. When
you're asked directly, what can you do about protecting it?
Within trade secrets law, there's this reasonable precaution requirement
under American law. It appears in the UTSA, 9 and it appears in the DTSA as part
of the definition for what it is to be a trade secret. The requirement is simply that a
trade secret owner have taken reasonable precautions in order to protect their trade
secret. For those who are out there who are litigators, it's a case-by-case, factspecific kind of inquiry.
Sometimes it involves cost-benefit analysis. It's rarely decided as a matter
of law except for certain kinds of precautions that have become really standard like
nondisclosure agreements. Now with everything moving online or technical,
passwords are another thing that we're seeing in the case law where you'll be found
to have failed to satisfy that requirement if you didn't at least take those basic
precautions.
Usually, it's more about a suite of precautions, so the nondisclosure
agreements plus certain kinds of access controls, both physical and technological.
To a certain extent, certain kinds of notice that you might provide to employees or
collaborators, that “ubiquitous, confidential, or proprietary information” that we see
stamped on a lot of things.
There's some theoretical disagreement among scholars about exactly what
role this is supposed to play, but certainly, it serves many useful functions. It's
evidence that the information was treated as a secret, that it was taken by improper
means, and that it had some value because effort was taken and maybe some
evidence of what exactly that value was as a function of the security precautions.
9
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Recent scholarship has really been focusing on the notice function of it, in so far as
we're thinking of trade secrets as a proprietary interest.
My work began by asking, "Well, what about a lie?" When I started asking
people about it, it’s interesting, you've got polarized reactions. But one of the
dominant ones was, "Oh, that's fraud. You obviously can't lie in order to protect
your proprietary information." I thought, “No, no, no. Of course, a court’s not going
to call it that. They're going to use a different term.”
When you start thinking about it that way, the examples pop up. Deception
has a long history in IP both in this country and elsewhere: the use of mountweazels
and data sets, fake data in a data set in order to catch somebody that has copied your
data set, fake doors, code names for projects, and canary traps of a more traditional
kind. Those have been increasingly used in cyberspace.
If I could show you my slide, I could show you some of the great headlines
in advertising, because not only is this gaining traction, but actually, it's being
rebranded as deception technology. There was a headline in an industry mag back
in September, “MITRE Shield Shows Why Deception Is the Next Big Thing in
Security.” Some of the cybersecurity companies that are building some of this
deception technology — a company called “Illusive” boats of over 75 deceptive
techniques that you can use to identify both internal and external would-bemisappropriators on your network in order to catch them and watch them. You fill
out the form and learn more about how deception can help you protect your
company's information.
Most of this is using different kinds of honeypots, so a decoy computer
network or a network system designed to attract hackers that's isolated from the
main system. Some of the more sophisticated kinds of laying traps throughout the
actual internal system, this is what Illusive and MITRE and other companies in this
space at least represent that they're doing, by leaving fake trails of information. The
passwords that might be inadvertently saved by your web browser, they plant fake
passwords.
This is all very interesting but what does it have to do with lawyers? Well,
it's starting to appear in case law. We're starting to have some early harbinger cases
here in the US. One big one — all right, it's not so big — is SolarCity v. Pure Solar
Company.10 It was in the US District Court for the Central District of California.
There, you see it talks a little bit in the denial of the motion to dismiss, but if you
dig into the pleadings, what happened to SolarCity was they had an internal
employee that they believed was selling customer information to a competitor. In
the process of investigating this, they built a honeypot, they built a decoy system.
When the internal employee was trying to take the information, the system
would give them a decoy phone number. He was then passing along these decoy
phone numbers to Pure Solar. Pure Solar representatives were making calls to these
customers on the decoy phone lines, and there was a setup receiving line to receive
these calls and then basically pretend to be these customers so they could pump out
as much information about who Pure Solar was and try to figure out exactly why
they were getting these phone calls.
10

SolarCity Corporation v. Pure Solar Co., No. CV 16-01814-BRO (DTBx), 2016 WL
11019989 (C.D. Dec. 27, 2016).

8

Session 7D
In the pleadings, the company explained this use of the decoy phone
numbers and then in the causes of action under the DTSA and UTSA identify the
development of the system as satisfying the reasonable precaution requirement
under both the California UTSA and the Defend Trade Secrets Act. Then the court
in ruling on the motion to dismiss — the satisfaction of the RPR11 wasn't really
challenged — the court accepted it and the parties seemed to both accept that some
of these measures were obviously sufficient, but the court did find it quite useful
evidentiary.
In some of the same functions that I talked about the RPR just a second ago,
it found that they established misappropriation during the requisite time for
application of the DTSA, so the honeypot was really useful for establishing that
timeline. They also found it as establishing loss, as establishing the cost of creating
this honeypot as establishing a measure of the value of the trade secrets that were
taken, not just for the trade secret causes of action, but also for the application of
the CFAA,12 which has a minimum amount in controversy of $5,000 in the court.
This is limited, this is an early case. I anticipate, although I'd be interested
in hearing what my fellow panelists have to say, that this may be an increasing
phenomenon. It doesn't particularly serve the notice function of the reasonable
precaution requirement as we were discussing by email, and I'd love to get into that
a little more. But it does seem to serve all of these other evidentiary purposes of the
reasonable precaution requirement as well as other elements for related causes of
action that might arise in these cases. I'll leave it there. I see the time that has gone,
and we can discuss some of the other implications in the conversation.
JAN-DIEDERIK LINDEMANS: Thank you, Courtney, also for respecting
the time. That actually was not just an original talk, but also quite inspirational for
me as a litigator to go into some of those techniques. While you were talking, I saw
that Professor Sandeen was nodding a lot, and I don't know whether that was
because she wanted to say something or react to something that you said or
whatever she was preparing to rebut to something that Victoria said earlier. I’ll
leave it up to her to surprise us with what she would like to say.
SHARON SANDEEN: Yes. First of all, let me thank Courtney for her paper
and her presentation. I think I can speak for Vicky too to say that as people who've
been engaging in trade secret scholarship for decades now, we are very excited to
see a lot of newer scholars enter the field with such interesting, new ideas. My
response, however, would be this: It's not so much about trade secrets, per se, but
it's about how companies and information technology people and information
security people look at information differently from how lawyers look at it. This is
exactly why lawyers need to be involved in advising companies about information
security.
What happens in information security is the focus is on actual security,
absolute security. This is what would be the ideal for anybody trying to protect
information held by a company, whether it's a trade secret or not. Then the next

11
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focus is on having reasonable security to meet GDPR13 requirements and similar
laws on a privacy front. But these efforts may not suffice for trade secret
misappropriation purposes for the reasons you indicate, Courtney, because there is
this very important notice function of the reasonable efforts requirement.
The way I like to describe it is: imagine if you take the three requirements
of trade secrecy that exist in the US, and now in the EU and that aren’t set forth in
the TRIPS agreement, 14 and you ask your question, “Okay, the information has to
be secret, not generally known or readily ascertainable. It has to have commercial
value because it is secret. And then there's this third requirement of reasonable
effort. If the information is already secret and already has value, why do we have a
third requirement?”
I think the most powerful argument is because the efforts have to put on
notice the person and companies that you want to be under an obligation to maintain
the secrecy and confidentiality of that information. I will add that that's particularly
important in the United States, and in other countries that are under pressure from
the United States, notably, for instance, Canada, who just changed their laws, where
there's an imposition of criminal responsibility for trade secret misappropriation.
I for one do not want a law where I can go to prison, federal prison, and
never be told what it is that I'm supposed to keep confidential and secret. That's
why I tend to highlight that particular requirement at least when it comes to trade
secrecy. Thank you.
VICTORIA CUNDIFF: I would make a couple of observations including
one literal observation, which is that my apartment is right across from Fordham
Law School. I am seeing the beautiful magnolia tree and full bloom that we have
often gathered under in the past and hope to in the future. This discussion is
provocative, and I think that we might profitably divide it into two parts. One is, as
Sharon notes, the actual desire to protect the trade secrets, that's the “lock” aspect.
If you lock it up, people aren't going to be acquiring it.
It sounds like some of the procedures that were utilized in the SolarCity case
that you described were directed to that end about, “We know somebody is trying
to ex-filtrate our trade secrets, let's make sure that he's not able to do it.” But to
prove misappropriation, as Sharon notes, you must present that the person knew or
should have known that the information was intended to be kept secret.
I think the notice function, I'm not familiar with the full details of that case,
but presumably, the evidence would have shown that the defendant knew that the
information was intended to be secret. That's why, in fact, they were trying to
acquire it, rather than by searching for it on the internet or by going to the owner of
the information. It’s almost like a sting operation that was set up because the
defendant knew the information was information that he shouldn't be trying to
develop. The company was using stealth help to ensure that he didn't.
13
Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016
on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free
movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation),
2016 O.J. (L 119) 1.
14
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS),
Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 300.

10

Session 7D
We've talked about other situations. It turns out there are apparently
multiple scenarios where a company's source code has been somehow stolen and
then is being offered on the internet in a very sketchy way that it's like, "Oh, here's
the source code to pick your favorite major thing." To try to remedy that problem,
sometimes the proprietor of the actual source code may flood the market with other
sketchy offers about, “Oh, get your stolen software here.” All of the people who
are trying to access it think they're getting stolen software, and maybe they are not
because it's been able to be camouflaged.
Nonetheless, at the end of the day, to prove the case, the plaintiff will have
to show that as to the original misappropriator, that they knew or should have
known that the information was secret. A remedial measure of trying to camouflage
what has happened may be useful, but it doesn't substitute for establishing liability
on the part of the first misappropriator.
RICHARD ARNOLD: I just wanted to add two more dimensions to this
discussion because I agree with what Sharon and Victoria have both said. But two
distinctions I would introduce at this point are, first of all, when we're talking about
reasonable precautions, I completely agree about this having a notice function. Of
course, we mustn't forget that, in trade secrets cases, there are typically two
scenarios. One is misuse by the employee or the ex-employee. You're trying to give
notice to your employees and future ex-employees as to what they must regard as
company property, as distinct from their own skill and knowledge, which they can
take elsewhere. But then there's the external hackers. Of course, the role of
reasonable precautions there is much less about notice in that sense, although it
does have some function, it's more about why should the law help those who don't
help themselves?
Then the other distinction I'd like to bring into this discussion is between
what you're doing to create a protectable trade secret in the first place and then what
you're trying to do by way of evidence gathering in circumstances where you
suspect there's been misappropriation. It seems to me that a lot of what Courtney's
talking about, and I'd be interested in her response, is really about evidence
gathering rather than about how you create a protectable trade secret in the first
place.
JAN-DIEDERIK LINDEMANS: [unintelligible] something and maybe we
can have a conclusive remark. Very often in trade secrets litigation, submitting
convincing proof is the biggest issue. When I heard you talking, I felt like there are
some interesting ideas there to get access to proof.
COURTNEY COX: Yes, there are a few thoughts. The first is what function
might these deceptions provide or serve? I agree with Vicky that one of them is the
lock, keeping and identifying intruders and cornering them off into what looks like
the system, but isn't actually a system. One of the interesting things about the use
of them is they don't only serve the lock function, they also serve a safeguard
function, recognizing that you have been breached, recognizing that further
measures might need to be taken — this investigative purpose that Lord Justice
Arnold is raising.
In the cases at issue here, the notice function is in some ways served by
other precautions. I don't know if it makes sense to think of the deception as being,

11

Session 7D
"All you have to do is lie and your trade secrets are protected." No, this is part of a
larger package of, “Have you done something reasonable?” It can evidence misuse
by both the employee, the ex-employee and the external, that they were going in
the facility where they weren't supposed to. That's part of this idea of leaving the
trail of password data in — altering passwords, leaving fake passwords and logons
that Illusive and some of the others claim to be doing.
It can also be used as basic training for your employees. While I was
working on this, I received a lovely birthday present from Fordham IT in the form
of a phishing simulation. “Dear, Professor Cox, your package has been delivered,”
I’m like, “Oh, no, this looks like spam.” I reported it and they said, "Oh, thank you,
nothing to worry about here." I was like, "What do you mean nothing to worry
about here?" and they said, "Oh, well, it's just a simulation."
Sharon, I think I saw you tweeted out about something similar that happened
at your university. As these become more common, I think there's a question of, if
your entity failed to take even these basic ones, have you done enough to protect
— have you even taken bare bones minimum reasonable requirements to prevent
things from falling into the public domain as needed to satisfy some of these
requirements?
JAN-DIEDERIK LINDEMANS: I actually agree. Training is probably one
of the most efficient, reasonable measures you can take to keep your secrets safe.
COURTNEY COX: But it requires lying to your employees in this new
context. Sharon, I think you said you had gotten in trouble when you notified your
colleagues?
SHARON SANDEEN: What happened is my school hired a consultant to
help us stop phishing attacks and they advised us to send out phony phishing
requests. I got in trouble because I was supposed to click a button that said it's a
phishing attempt rather than what I did, which was to notify all my colleagues,
"Don't click on this because it's a phishing attempt," which was an interesting
information security process, because they're basically socializing us to click a
button rather than advise the whole entity, which I thought was totally bizarre, but
anyway.
VICTORIA CUNDIFF: That way, they can assess whether it's a genuine
threat or not. We have that button too. Sometimes you get these emails from people
you don't know, and you're not sure. Then they can look at it through various
scanning devices and report, "Yes, it's malicious software,” or, “No, it seems okay,
but still be careful."
COURTNEY COX: I think they handled some of that problem at Fordham.
There were multiple different kinds of this phishing email that went out. Even if I
had shared it with the rest of the faculty, that wouldn’t have destroyed the
simulation for everyone. But I would have thought notifying people is also helpful.
JAN-DIEDERIK LINDEMANS: Speaking of destruction, you may have
noticed that unlike in a ‘live setting’ at Fordham, there are no bombs here that go
off when we go over time. The previous panel went well over time. We're doing
the exact same. I know that there's a virtual lunch break scheduled now. We've
eaten some of that time already. I would like to thank all of you for a very interesting
pre-discussion and discussion today.
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